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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
571 (1894) ; Patterson v. New River & P. C. Ry., 87 W. Va. 177, 104
S. E. 491 (1920), and State v. Sauls, 97 AV. Va. 184, 124 S. E. 670
(1924), the subsequent trial was that of the same issue. and no prob-
lem of unidentical issues was present. Since the courts, in general,
have broadly developed most exceptions to the hearsay rule to allow
as much of the evidence as is trustworthy to come before the court
and jury in order to get all the facts of the case, it is submitted that
the West Virginia court in the principal case has avoided the "nar-
row and pedantic illiberality" often applied to the problem.
M. S. K.
NEcGLIGENCE- es Ipsa Loquitur-XCLUSIVENESS OF DEFEND-
ANT'S CONTROL OVER RESIDUAL CIRCU!1STAONCES AFTER ALL ELEMENTS
OF SHARED CONTROL ELItNATmD.-Plaintiff'S intestate, a brake-
man employed by defendant, was killed when a freight car upon
which he was riding was derailed and plaintiff sought damages
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 53
STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U. S. § 51 (1940). There was evidence that
deceased had signalled the engineer to stop, thrown a switch to put
the cars on a siding, climbed back upon the car, and signalled the
e~gineer to proceed. Plaintiff was unable to show any evidence of
particular acts of negligence. The district court directed a verdict
for defendant on the first count alleging negligence of defendant
with respect to car, track or roadbed but submitted the second count
tlleging negligence generally, with no particulars specified to the
jury on the theory of res ipsa loqaitur. Following verdict and judg-
ment for plaintiff, the circuit court of appeals reversed, because de-
fendant did not have exclusive control over all the probable causa-
tive factors connected with the injury. Held, that the jury could
from the circumstances fairly infer negligence of the defendant
upon finding that the deceased was free from any negligence that
contributed to the derailment. Judgment reversed. Jesionowski
v Boston & Ma ie R. R., .67 S. Ct. 401 (U. S. 1947).
It is generally accepted formula that three essentials for the
application of res ipsa loquitur are (1) a type of accident which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence (2) caused by
al agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the de-
fendant and (3) not attributable to any voluntary action or want of
care of the person injured. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233
(1912); 4 WOmORE, EVmENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2509. The instant
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case, without questioning that these are requisites, raises the ques-
tion, apparently for the first time, whether the second element pre-
cludes resort to the doctrine where certain aspects of the occurrence
are shown to have been within the control of others, even of the
person injured, but all such aspects are found not to have been
causative of the injury.
The requirement that the injury must have arisen from an in-
strumentality in defendant's exclusive possession and control is uni-
formly recognized in England, Scott v. London & St. K. Docks Co.,
3 H. & C. 596 (Exch. 1865), the federal courts, San Ju n Light Co.
v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89 (1911) ; United Stales v. Porter Brothers
& Biffle, 95 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), and the various state
courts. Phillippi v. Farmers' Mutual Telephone Co., 113 W. Va.
470,. 178 S. E. 762 (1933) ; Decatur v. Eady, 186 Ind. 205, 115 N. E.
577 (1917) ; Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 959 (1925).
Res ipsa loquitur is a fortiori unavailable where the injuring agency
was partly or entirely under the control and management of the
person injured. Courtney v. New York. N. H. & H. Ry., 213 Fed.
388 (D. Conn. 1914) ; (1928) 45 C. J. 1216.
But the instant case raises the question of what amounts to ex-
clusive control and when the defendant can be said to have such con-
trol over the injuring agency. Where all the probable causative fac-
4.ors were in the exclusive control of the defendant there has been
no doubt that the doctrine is applicable, but this is not the extent
or limit of the doctrine. Res ipsa loquitur has been applied where
two defendants retained control of the instrumentality causing the
injury, Smvith v. Claude Neon Lights, 110 N. J. L. 326, 164 Atl. 423
(1933), and applied where a passenger was injured in a collision
between a carrier and another vehicle not under the carrier's con-
trol. Interstate Stage Lives v. Aylers, 42 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 8th,
1930) ; Crozier v. Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N. W. 320
(1929).
Where others, even including the injured party, had control
exclusively, or along with the defendant, of some factors which
might have caused the injury, it is for the jury to decide whether
these factors contributed to the injury. If the jury finds that plain-
tiff's proof does not eliminate these factors then res ipsa loquitur
does not apply. But where plaintiff's proof does show that these
factors did not contribute to the accident that caused the injury and
the only factors left that could have caused the accident are those in
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the exclusive control of the defendant, then the doctrine is appli-
cable.
The instant case belongs in the last category. The jury, having
the evidence before it, knowing that plaintiff might have had con-
trol of one or more of the factors causing the accident, found that
these factors did not cause it. The defendant then must have had
exclusive control of all the factors causing the accident.
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is nothing but a picturesque way of
describing a balance of probability on a question of fact on which
little evidence either way has been presented. The principle is one
of inclusion and not exclusion and a plaintiff whose case comes
within the principle is entitled to go to the jury and no plaintiff
who makes a probable case is disentitled to go to the jury by the fact
that his case does not come within it or goes beyond it. Washington
Loan & Trust Co. v. Hickey, 137 F. (2d) 677 (C. C. A. D. C., 1943).
WXhile the instant case might be a new step in the use of the doctrine,
it cannot be said to be a change in the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The
essential requirement that the instrumentality must be in the ex-
clusive control of the defendant has taken on added meaning and
possibly it will be well for the courts to give more emphasis to es-
sentials (1) and (3) as a measure to check too great an expansion
of the doctrine through this second essential. To go to the other ex-
treme where a too literal application of the condition of exclusive
control is required may lead to such a result as was arrived at in
Kilgore v. Shepard & Co.. 52 R. I. 151, 158 Atl. 720 (1932), where a
customer in a store sat down in a chair which collapsed. The court
held the rcs ipsa loquitur doctrine inapplicable for the chair in
question was under the exclusive control and use of the customer.
Such application unduly narrows the limits of the doctrine
while the application of the instant case broadens it with the result
that the plaintiff in negligence cases will be able to invoke the aid
of res ipsa loquitur in many situations where it has heretofore been
considered inapplicable.
L. H. B.
PLEADING - ACTIONS - INJURY TO PERSON AND PROPERTY ONE
CAUSE OF A'riON.-In a personal injury action, the common pleas
court of Kanawha county allowed plaintiff to amend her decla-
ration to include damages to her automobile. The circuit court af-
firmed. the amendment to this extent but held it too broad on other
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